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ABSTRACT
Training machine learning (ML) models is expensive in terms of
computational power, amounts of labeled data and human expertise.
Thus, ML models constitute intellectual property (IP) and business
value for their owners. Embedding digital watermarks duringmodel
training allows a model owner to later identify their models in
case of theft or misuse. However, model functionality can also be
stolen via model extraction, where an adversary trains a surrogate
model using results returned from a prediction API of the original
model. Recent work has shown that model extraction is a realistic
threat. Existing watermarking schemes are ineffective against IP
theft via model extraction since it is the adversary who trains the
surrogate model. In this paper, we introduce DAWN (Dynamic
Adversarial Watermarking of Neural Networks), the first approach
to use watermarking to deter model extraction IP theft. Unlike prior
watermarking schemes, DAWN does not impose changes to the
training process but it operates at the predictionAPI of the protected
model, by dynamically changing the responses for a small subset of
queries (e.g., <0.5%) from API clients. This set is a watermark that
will be embedded in case a client uses its queries to train a surrogate
model. We show that DAWN is resilient against two state-of-the-art
model extraction attacks, effectively watermarking all extracted
surrogate models, allowing model owners to reliably demonstrate
ownership (with confidence >1 − 2−64), incurring negligible loss of
prediction accuracy (0.03-0.5%).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in machine learning (ML) has led to a dramatic
surge in the use of ML models for a wide variety of applications.
Major enterprises like Google, Apple, and Facebook have already
deployed ML models in their products [41]. ML-related businesses
are expected to generate trillions of dollars in revenue in the near
future [14]. The process of collecting training data and training
ML models is the basis of the business advantage of model owners.
Hence, protecting the intellectual property (IP) embodied in ML
models is necessary.
One approach for IP protection of ML models is watermarking.
Recent work [1, 31, 48] has shown how digital watermarks can
be embedded into deep neural network models (DNNs) during
training. Watermarks consist of a set of inputs, the trigger set, with
incorrectly assigned labels. A legitimate model owner can use the
trigger set, along with a large training set with correct labels, to
train a watermarked model and distribute it to his customers. If he
later encounters a model he suspects to be a copy of his own, he
can demonstrate ownership by using the trigger set as inputs to the
suspected model. These watermarking schemes allow legitimate
model owners to detect theft or misuse of their models.
Instead of distributing ML models to customers, an increasingly
popular alternative business paradigm is to allow customers to
use models via prediction APIs. But one can mount a model ex-
traction [42] attack via such APIs by sending a sequence of API
queries with different inputs and using the resulting predictions
to train a surrogate model with similar functionality as the queried
model. Model extraction attacks are effective even against complex
DNN models [21, 33], and are difficult to prevent [21]. Existing
watermarking techniques, which rely on model owners to embed
watermarks during training, are ineffective against model extrac-
tion since it is the adversary who trains the surrogate model.
In this paper we introduce DAWN (Dynamic Adversarial Wa-
termarking of Neural Networks), a new watermarking approach
intended to deter IP theft via model extraction. DAWN is designed
to be deployed within the prediction API of a model. It dynamically
watermarks a tiny fraction of queries from a client by changing
the prediction responses for them. The watermarked queries serve
as the trigger set if an adversarial client trains a surrogate model
using the responses to its queries. The model owner can use the
trigger set to demonstrate IP ownership of the extracted surrogate
model as in prior DNN watermarking solutions [1, 48]. DAWN dif-
fers from them in that it is the adversary (model thief), rather than
the defender (original owner) who trains the watermarked model.
This raises two new challenges: (1) defenders must choose trigger
sets from among queries sent by clients and cannot choose optimal
trigger sets from the whole input space; (2) adversaries can select
the training data or manipulate the training process to resist the
embedding of watermarks. DAWN addresses both these challenges.
DAWN watermarks are client-specific: DAWN not only infers
whether a given model is a surrogate but, in case of model extrac-
tion, also identifies the client whose queries were used to train
the surrogate. DAWN is parametrized so that changed predictions
needed for watermarking are sufficiently rare as to not degrade the
utility of the original model for legitimate API clients.
We make the following contributions:
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• present DAWN, the first approach for dynamic, selective
watermarking for DNN models at their prediction APIs for
deterring IP theft via model extraction (Sect. 4),
• empirically assess it (Sect. 5) using several DNN models
and datasets showing that DAWN is robust to adversarial
manipulations and resilient to evasion (Sect. 6), and
• show that DAWN is resistant to two state-of-the-art ex-
traction attacks, reliably demonstrating ownership (with
confidence >1 − 2−64) with negligible impact on model
utility (0.03-0.5% decrease in accuracy) (Sect. 7).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Neural Network
A DNN is a function F : Rn → Rm , where n is the number of
input features and m ≥ 2 is the number of output classes in a
classification task. F (x) is a vector of lengthm containing proba-
bilities pj that x belongs to each class c j ∈ C for j ∈ {1,m}. The
predicted class, Fˆ (x), is obtained by applying the argmax function:
Fˆ (x) = arдmax(F (x)) = c . F is trained such that Fˆ (x) approximates
a perfect oracle function Of : Rn → C which gives the true class c
for any sample x ∈ Rn . If F is successfully trained, Fˆ ∼ Of , and the
accuracy of F is close to 1: Acc(F ) = 1− ϵ where ϵ is the irreducible
error.
2.2 Model Extraction Attacks
In model extraction [9, 21, 33, 34, 42], an adversary A wants to
“steal” a DNN model FV of a victimV by making a series of pre-
diction requests U to FV and obtaining predictions FV (U ). U and
FV (U ) are used byA to train a surrogate model FA .A’s goal is to
have Acc(FA ) as close as possible to Acc(FV ). All model extraction
attacks [9, 21, 33, 34, 42] operate in a black-box setting: A has ac-
cess to a prediction API,A uses the set < U , FV (U ) > to iteratively
refine the accuracy of FA . Depending on the adversary model,A’s
capabilities can be divided into three categories: model knowledge,
data access, and querying strategy.
Model knowledge. A does not know the exact architecture
of FV or the hyperparameters or the training process. However,
given the purpose of the API (e.g., image recognition) and expected
complexity of the task, A may attempt to guess the architecture
of the model [21, 34]. On the other hand, if FV is complex, A can
use a publicly available, high capacity model pre-trained with a
very large benchmark datasets [33]. While the above methods focus
on DNNs, there are alternatives targeting simpler models: logistic
regression, decision trees, shallow neural networks [42].
Data access.A’s main limitation is the lack of access to natural
data that comes from the same distribution as the data used to train
FV . A may use data that comes from the same domain as V’s
training data but from a different distribution [9]. If A does not
exactly know the distribution or the domain, it may use widely
available natural data [33] to mount the attack. Alternatively, it
may use only synthetic samples [42] or a mix of a small number of
natural samples augmented by synthetic samples [21, 34].
Querying strategy. All model stealing attacks [9, 21, 33, 34,
42] consist of alternating phases of A querying FV , followed by
training the surrogate model FA using the obtained predictions.A
queries FV with all its data and then trains the surrogate model [9,
33]. Alternatively, if A relies primarily on synthetic data [21, 34],
it deliberately crafts inputs that would help it train FA .
2.3 Watermarking DNN models
Digital watermarking is a technique used to covertly embed a
marker, the watermark, in an object (image, audio, etc.) which can
be used to demonstrate ownership of the object. Watermarking
of DNN models leverages the massive overcapacity of DNNs and
their ability to fit data with arbitrary labels [47]. DNNs have a large
number of parameters, many of which have little significance for
their primary classification task. These parameters can be used to
carry additional information beyond what is required for its pri-
mary classification task. This property is exploited by backdooring
attacks, which consist in training a DNN model that deliberately
outputs incorrect predictions for some selected inputs [7, 17].
Watermarking of DNNmodels is currently based on backdooring
attacks [1, 10, 31, 48]. We want to train a DNN model F : Rn →
Rm for which the primary task is that Fˆ (x) = arдmax(F (x)) = c
approximates an oracle Of : Rn → C . Embedding a watermark in
F consists of enabling F with a secondary classification task: for
a subset of samples x ∈ T ⊂ Rn , we want Fˆ to output incorrect
prediction classes as defined by a function B : T → Rm such that
Bˆ(x) , Of (x). We call B(x) a backdoor function andT a trigger set:T
triggers the backdoor. F is trained using the trigger setT mislabeled
using Bˆ(x) in addition to a larger set of samplesx ∈ Rn\T accurately
labeled using Of (x). F is a watermarked DNN model which is
expected to approximate the backdoor function B(x) for x ∈ T and
the oracle Of for x ∈ Rn \T .
The trigger setT and the outputs of the backdoor function for its
elements Bˆ(T ) compose the watermark: (T , Bˆ(T )). Let F ′ be a DNN
model that copies F . The watermark can be used to demonstrate
ownership of F ′. It only requires F ′ to expose a prediction API
which can be used to query all samples in the trigger set x ∈ T .
A sufficient number of predictions Fˆ ′(x) such that Fˆ ′(x) = Bˆ(x)
demonstrates that F ′ is a copy of the watermarked model F .
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 Adversary Model
The adversaryA mounts a model extraction attack against a victim
model FV using queries to its prediction API. A’s goal is model
functionality stealing [33]: train a surrogate model FA that performs
well on a classification task for which FV was designed. If FˆV ∼ Of
thenA’s goal is that FˆA ∼ Of , which can be considered successful
ifAcc(FA ) ∼ Acc(FV ). A secondary goal is to minimize the number
of queries to FV necessary for A to train FA .
A has full control over the samples DA it chooses to query
FV with. These can be natural [33] or synthetic [21, 34, 42]. A
obtains a prediction for each query in the form of probability vectors
FV (x) or single classes FˆV (x),∀x ∈ DA . A uses queried samples
and their predictions to train FA , a DNN. It chooses the DNN
model architecture, training hyperparameters and training process.
Requiring FA to be a DNN is justified by the observations in prior
work on model extraction attacks [21, 33, 34] that FA needs to have
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equal or larger capacity than FV in order for model extraction to be
successful. DNNs have the greatest capacity among MLmodels [47].
3.2 Assumptions
We assume that for a given input x ∈ DA , A has no a priori
expectation regarding the prediction FV (x).A treats y = FV (x) as
the ground truth label for x ∈ DA .A expects that multiple queries
of the same input x must return the same prediction y.
Our focus is onA who makes FA available via a prediction API
since it has the greatest impact onV’s business advantage. We do
not consider an A who keeps FA for private use. This is similar
to media watermarking schemes where access to allegedly stolen
media is a pre-requisite for ownership demonstration [35].
3.3 DAWN Goals and Overview
On one hand, model extraction attacks against DNNs have been
proven difficult to defend against [21]. On the other hand, existing
watermarking techniques [1, 10, 31] are vulnerable to model extrac-
tion attacks [48]. To address these limitations, we design a solution
to identify and prove the ownership of DNN models stolen through
a prediction API.
Our solution, DAWN (Dynamic Adversarial Watermarking of
Neural Networks), is an additional component added in front of a
model prediction API (Fig. 1). DAWN dynamically embeds a water-
mark in responses to queries made by a API client. This watermark
is composed of inputs xi ∈ T for which we return incorrect pre-
dictions B(xi ) , FV (xi ). A uses all the responses including these
mislabeled samples (xi ,B(xi )) to train FA . FA will remember those
samples as a backdoor [7] that represents the watermark (as in
traditional DNN watermarking techniques). If FA exposes a public
prediction API, a judge J can run a verification process (verify),
which confirms FA is a surrogate of FV . Verify checks that for suf-
ficient number of inputs xi ∈ T , we have FˆA (xi ) = Bˆ(xi ) , FˆV (xi ).
DAWN embeds a watermark into a subset of queries it receives so
that any FA trained using these responses will retain the water-
mark.
3.4 System requirements
Wedefine the following requirements for thewatermark thatDAWN
embeds in FA during an extraction attack.W1-W3were introduced
in [1] whileW4 is a new requirement specific to DAWN.
W1 Unremovability: A is unable to remove the watermark
from FA without significantly decreasing its accuracy, ren-
dering it “unusable”. If FV is free of the watermark, then
Acc(FA ) ≪ Acc(FV ).
W2 Reliability: If verify outputs “true” for awatermark (T , BˆV (T ))
on a model F ′, then F ′ is a surrogate of FV , with high confi-
dence. On the other hand, if F ′ is not a surrogate,A cannot
generate a watermark (T , Bˆ(T )) such that verify outputs
“true” (non-trivial ownership).
W3 Non-ownership piracy: A cannot produce a watermark
for a model that was already watermarked byV , such that
it can castV’s ownership into doubt.
W4 Linkability: If verify outputs “true” for a model FA , the
watermark used for verification (T , Bˆ(T )) can be linked to
a specific API client whose queries were used to train FA .
DA
x0 , FV(x0) 
xm , FV(xm)
xn , B(xn)
xN , B(xN)
or
FV(xi)xi
xi
FV(xi) B(xi)
xi
xn , B(xn) 
xN , B(xN)
xi FA(xi)
Train
FA surrogate
of FV ?
B(xi)
=/≠ ?
=
=?
verify
watermark
FA
FV
DAWN
API to FAAPI to FV


API
client







Figure 1:DAWN system overview with four parties: a victim
V owning a model FV , API clients querying the model pre-
diction API, an adversary A training a surrogate model FA
and a judge J verifying the surrogacy of FA .
We identify additional requirements X1-X3:
X1 Utility: Incorrect predictions returned by DAWN do not
significantly degrade the prediction service provided to
legitimate API clients: Acc(DAWN + FV ) ∼ Acc(FV ).
X2 Indistinguishability:A cannot distinguish incorrect pre-
dictions B(x) from correct victim model predictions FV (x).
X3 Collusion resistance: Watermark unremovability (W1),
linkability (W4) and indistinguishability (X2) must remain
valid even if the extraction attack is distributed among
several API clients.
In contrast to traditional DNN watermarking, DAWN does not
aim at maximizing the accuracy of the watermarkedmodelAcc(FA )
on a primary classification task.
3.5 Relation to other attacks
DAWN is different from prior work where the goal is to (a) degrade
model performance (decrease test accuracy Acctest – typical of
poisoning attacks [2, 32]), (b) trigger targeted misclassifications
(classify a trigger set with high accuracy Accbd – typical to back-
dooring [28]) or (c) embed a watermark while preserving high
model performance (reach high Accbd and Acctest – typical of
DNN watermarking [1, 31]). In contrast to backdooring, DAWN
cannot inject arbitrary samples in DA but it can modify the label
of DA samples to any incorrect prediction c , FˆV (x). In contrast
to traditional DNN watermarking,V neither controls the training
of FA nor can it choose the trigger set from the whole input space
Rn :V is limited to the set of samples DA submitted byA. Table 1
summarizes these differences.
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Table 1: Adversarial watermarking (DAWN) capabilities and
goals compared to (a) poisoning attacks, (b) backdoor attacks
and (c) prior DNN watermarking.
Capabilities Goal
Modify Inject Control
labels in DA training Acctest Accbd
Poisoning Yes Yes No Low –
Backdoor Yes Yes Yes / No – High
Watermarking Yes Yes Yes High High
DAWN Yes No No – High
4 DYNAMIC ADVERSARIAL WATERMARKS
We first present the method for generating and embedding an ad-
versarial watermark. Then we describe the process for proving
ownership of a model using the watermark.
4.1 Watermark generation
We define watermarking an input x as returning an incorrect predic-
tion BV (x) instead of the correct prediction FV (x). The collection
of all watermarked inputs composes the trigger set TA that will be
a backdoor to any FA trained using responses from FV including
TA . Consequently, inputs x ∈ TA and their corresponding predic-
tion classes BˆV (x) compose the watermark to the surrogate model
(TA , BˆV (TA )). We define two functions:
• WV (x): should the response to x be watermarked?
• BV (x): what is the (backdoored watermark) response?
A must not be able to predictWV (x) or distinguish between
BV (x) and FV (x). The same query, regardless of the API client,
must always get the same output. Both functions must be determin-
istic random functions specific to FV to fulfill these properties.
We use the result of a keyed cryptographic hash function as
a source for randomness. We compute HMAC(Kw ,x) using SHA-
256, where Kw is a model-specific secret key generated by DAWN
and x is an input to FV . If x is a matrix of dimension d > 1, it is
flattened to a 1-dimensional vector. The result of the hash is split
in two parts HMAC(Kw ,x)[0, 127] and HMAC(Kw ,x)[128, 255], re-
spectively used inWV and BV . These numbers are independent
and provide a sufficient source for randomness for each function.
4.1.1 Watermarking decision. WV (x) is a boolean function. We
define rw as the fraction of inputs to be watermarked out of N
inputs submitted by an API client. rw will define the size of the
trigger set |TA | = ⌊rw × N ⌋. Then:
WV (x) =
{
1, if HMAC(Kw ,x)[0, 127] < rw × 2128.
0, otherwise.
(1)
The expectation thatWV returns 1 and thus to watermark a
sample is uniformly equal to rw . It is worth noting that DAWN
does not differentiate adversaries from benign API clients. Conse-
quently, any API client obtains a rate rw of incorrect predictions.
rw must be defined to meet a trade-off. A large rw increases the
reliability of ownership demonstration and prevents trivial own-
ership demonstration W2 as later discussed in Sect. 4.3. A small
rw maximizes utility X1 by minimizing the number of incorrect
predictions returned to benign API clients.
4.1.2 Backdoor function. We implement the backdoor function
BV (x) as a function of FV (x). Our motivations are two-fold. First,
this allows for deploying DAWN to protect any model FV without
the need for redefining BV . Second, it makes BV (x) consistent
with correct predictions FV (x). We define BV (x) = π (Kπ , FV (x))
where π : Rm → Rm is a keyed pseudo-random permutation
function with secret key Kπ . Even if an adversary uncovers values
BV (x) for a large number of inputs, it will not be able to infer the
function BV . This prevents an adversary from recovering FV (x)
from BV (x) in case it knows if an input is backdoored.
π (Kπ , FV (x)) does not need to permute allm positions of FV (x)
but only those with highest probabilities for the purpose of back-
dooring. A large number of classes typically have a 0 probability
value whenm is large. Considering that the number of positions to
permute is small, we use the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm [13] to
implement π . We useKπ = HMAC(Kw ,x) [128, 255] as the key that
determines the permutations performed during the Fisher-Yates
shuffle algorithm. A 128-bits key allows for list permutation of up
to 34 positions (34 prediction probabilities) in a secure manner.
4.1.3 Indistinguishability. OutputsBV (x)must be indistinguish-
able from FV (x) X2. This requirement is partially addressed by our
assumption that A has no expectation regarding predictions ob-
tained from FV (Sect. 3.2). Nevertheless, our watermarking function
WV is configured by a hash of the input x . A subtle modification δ
to x produces a different hash and consequently, a different result
WV (x) ,WV (x + δ ). If A receives different predictions for x and
x + δ for a small δ , it can discard both x and x + δ from its training
set to avoid the watermark.
Therefore we assume that A expects two similar inputs x and
x + δ to have similar predictions FV (x) ∼ FV (x + δ ) when δ is
small. To enhance indistinguishability, the decision ofWV must
be smoothened to return the same resultWV (x) =WV (x + δ ) and
BV (x) = BV (x+δ ). This can be achieved using a mapping function
MV : Rn → Rp that projects x to a space whereMV (x) = MV (x+
δ ) for a small δ .MV (x) is only used as the new input to our hash
function such that HMAC(Kw ,MV (x)) = HMAC(Kw ,MV (x + δ )).
MV (x) smoothens the decision ofWV and ensures that permuta-
tions performed in BV are the same for similar inputs (π is keyed
by the hash result).
MV could be implemented as an autoencoder which projects
inputs x to a latent space Rp of lower dimension p < n, discarding
small perturbations [30].MV could also be a masking and binning
function [8] removing large modifications of a single pixel value
(with masking) and small modifications of a large number of pixels
(with binning). We chose another solution forMV : use the embed-
ding obtained from a layer in the middle of FV . This is similar to
using an autoencoder but it does not require training additional
models. The obtained embedding would also be unknown to A
since it does not know FV (target of extraction attack).
For each input x , we obtain its latent representation LV based on
FV as xL = LV (FV ,x). This ensures that as long as FV ’s prediction
is resilient to perceptual modifications (e.g. translation, illumina-
tion), so is MV . Next, we smoothen xL by binarizing it based on
the median value of each of its features. The median of each feature
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value is obtained by querying FV usingV’s training set, recording
corresponding xL and taking the median. Using 5000 samples and
their intermediate representation of length 100, we get 100 feature
vectors of length 5000 and thus, 100 median values. We evaluate
MV in Sect. 6.2.
4.2 Watermark embedding
A uses the set of inputs DA and the corresponding predictions
returned by DAWN-protected prediction API of FV to train FA .
Approximately ⌊rw × |DA |⌋ samples from DA constitute the trig-
ger set TA consisting of incorrect predictions BV (x). Given that
FA has enough capacity (large enough number of parameters), it
will be able to remember a certain amount of training data having
arbitrarily incorrect labels [47]. This phenomenon is called overfit-
ting and it can be prevented using regularization [3]. But it is not
effective for DNNs with a large capacity [47]. This is the rationale
for the existence of DNN backdoors [28] and for DAWN. We expect
our watermark (TA , BˆV (TA )) to be embedded as a backdoor in FA
as a natural effect of training a model FA with high capacity. If
the watermark is not embedded, we expect FA ’s accuracy on the
primary task to be too low to make it usable (W1).
Different adversaries Ai will have different datasets DAi . Con-
sequently, the trigger sets TAi selected by DAWN will also be
different. Different surrogate models FAi will embed distinctive
watermarks. Each watermark thus links to the API client identifier.
DAWN meets the linkability requirementW4.
4.3 Watermark verification
We present the verify function used by J to prove a model F ′
is a surrogate of F . Verify tests if a given watermark (T , Bˆ(T )) is
embedded in a model F ′ suspected to be a surrogate of F . We first
define L(T , Bˆ(T ), F ′) that computes the ratio of different results
between the backdoor function Bˆ(x) and the suspected surrogate
model Fˆ ′(x) for all inputs in the trigger set.
L(T , Bˆ(T ), F ′) = 1|T |
∑
x ∈T
(Fˆ ′(x) , Bˆ(x)) (2)
The watermark verification succeeds, i.e., verify returns “true”, if
and only if L(T , Bˆ(T ), F ′) < e , where e is a tolerated error rate that
must be defined. This means we must have at most ⌊e×|T |⌋ samples
where Bˆ(x) and Fˆ ′(x) differ in order to declare F ′ is a surrogate of F .
The choice for the value of e is a trade-off between correctness and
completeness for watermark verification (reliabilityW2). Assume
we want to use a pre-generated watermark (T , Bˆ(T )) to verify if
an arbitrary model F ′ is a surrogate. For simplicity, we assume a
uniform probability of matching the prediction of a watermarked
input P(Bˆ(x) = Fˆ ′(x)) = 1/m, wherem is the number of classes of
F ′. The probability for trivial watermark verification success, given
a trigger set of size |T | and an error rate e , can be computed using
the cumulative binomial distribution function as follows.
P(L < e) =
⌊e×|T | ⌋∑
i=0
(|T |
i
)
×
(
m − 1
m
)i
×
(
1
m
) |T |−i
(3)
This probability is the average success rate ofA wanting to frame
V for model stealing using an arbitrary watermark. Figure 2 depicts
the decrease of this success rate as we increase the watermark size.
We see that the verification function can accommodate a large error
rate (e > 0.5) while preventing trivial success in verification using
a small watermark (|T | ≈ 50). The error rate e must be defined
proportionally to the number of classesm. Large error rates can
be used for models with a large number of classes. For instance,
we can set e = 0.8 for a model withm = 256 classes, limiting the
adversary success rate to less than 2−64 for a watermark of size 70.
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Figure 2: Resilience to trivial watermark verification vs. size
of the watermark. Different tolerated error rates e and mod-
els with different number of classesm. The success rate for
trivial watermark verification decreases exponentially with
the watermark size.
The success rate in trivial verification is the complement of
the confidence for reliable watermark verification, and for reliable
demonstration of ownership by transition 1−P(L < e). The choice of
e defines the minimum watermark size given a targeted confidence.
Recall that this size must also be small to ensure utility of the model
to protect X1. The tolerated error must necessarily be lower than
the probability of random class match: e < (1 −m)/m. Also, e must
be larger than ϵ where Acc(FA ) = 1 − ϵ is the accuracy of the
watermarked surrogate model FA on the trigger set.
The success of watermark verification is not sufficient to declare
ownership of a surrogate model F ′. A can increase its success in
trivial watermark verification from random using several means.
For instance, knowing F and F ′, A can find inputs x for which
F (x) , F ′(x) and use pairs (x , F ′(x)) as a watermark that would
successfully pass watermark verification. Thus demonstrating own-
ership requires a careful process to ensure that the probability for
matching an incorrect prediction class remains random, ensuring
that the probability for trivial watermark verification follows Eq. 3.
4.4 Demonstrating ownership
We present the process for a model ownerV to demonstrate owner-
ship of a surrogate model watermarked by DAWN. It only requires
the suspected surrogate model FA to expose a prediction API. This
process uses a judge J who is trusted to (a) ensure confidential-
ity of all data submitted as input to the process and (b) correctly
execute and report the results of the specified verify. It also uses
a time-stamped public bulletin board, e.g., a blockchain, in which
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information can be published to provide proof of anteriority. J can
be implemented using an trusted execution environment (TEE) [12].
4.4.1 Watermark registration. V publishes cryptographic com-
mitments of the following elements in the public bulletin board:
• the model FV .
• for eachAPI client i , one registeredwatermark (TAi , BˆV (TAi )).
The commitment can be instantiated using a cryptographic hash
function H ( ), e.g., SHA-3. Each watermark should be linked to
the corresponding model, e.g., by associating H (FV ) with each
registered watermark.
Several updated versions of the registered watermark can be
published for each API client, as they make more queries to the
prediction API and their watermarks grow. The verification of any
one of these watermarks is sufficient to demonstrate ownership of
the model. We define the following rules for reliable demonstration
of ownershipW2 that prevents ownership piracyW3:
•
(
H (TAi , BˆV (TAi )),H (FV )
)
is valid only if published later
than H (FV ).
• A can refute FA is a surrogate model only if H (FA ) has
been published.
•
(
H (TAi , BˆV (TAi )),H (FV )
)
can only demonstrate that FA
is a surrogate of FV ifH (FA ) is published later thanH (FV )
(or not published at all).
• in case of contention, the model having its commitment
first published is deemed to be the original.
4.4.2 Verification process. WhenV suspects a model FA is a
surrogate of FV trained by an API client i , it provides a pointer to
the prediction API of FA to J . It also provides the following secret
information using a confidential communication channel: the API
client i watermark (TAi , BˆV (TAi )) and FV . J does the following
to check if FA is a surrogate of FV . If any step fails, the ownership
of FA is not considered to have been demonstrated. If all succeed,
J gives the verdict that FA is a surrogate of FV .
(1) compute H (TAi , BˆV (TAi )) and use it as a pointer to re-
trieve the registeredwatermark
(
H (TAi , BˆV (TAi )),H (F ′V )
)
from the public bulletin.
(2) computeH (FV ) and verifyH (FV ) = H (F ′V ), whereH (F ′V )
is extracted from the registered watermark.
(3) retrieve H (FV ) from the public bulletin and verify it was
published before
(
H (TAi , BˆV (TAi )),H (F ′V )
)
.
(4) query TAi to FA ’s prediction API and verify that
L(TAi , BˆV (TAi ), FA ) < e .
(5) input TAi to FV and verify BˆV (x) , FˆV (x),∀x ∈ TAi .
If FA ’s owner (A) wants to contest the verdict, it must provide
the original model F ′A to J using a confidential communication
channel. J assesses that the provided model and the API model
are the same FA = F ′A by verifying FA (x) = F ′A (x),∀x ∈ TAi .
Then, J computes H (F ′A ) and retrieves it from the public bulletin.
If H (F ′A ) was published before H (FV ), J concludes that F ′A = FA
is an original model.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1 Datasets and Models
5.1.1 Datasets. We evaluate DAWN using four image recog-
nition datasets that were used in prior work to evaluate DNN
extraction attacks and are presented in App. A. MNIST [26] and
GTSRB [39] are respectively a handwritten-digit and traffic-sign
dataset used to showcase the extraction of low capacity DNN mod-
els [21, 34]. CIFAR10 [24] andCaltech256 [16] contain images depict-
ing miscellaneous objects that were used to showcase the extraction
of high capacity DNN models [9, 33].
We also selected a random subset of 100,000 samples from Ima-
geNet dataset [11], which contains images of natural and man-made
objects. We use it to evaluate the embedding of different types of
watermarks and to perform a model extraction attack that requires
such samples [33].
5.1.2 Models. We select two kinds of DNN models to evalu-
ate the embedding of a watermark: low-capacity models having
less than 10M parameters, and high-capacity models having over
20M parameters. These models are presented in Table 2 and their
architecture is detailed in App. A.
Table 2: DNN models used to evaluate DAWN. Number of
training epochs and base test accuracy.
Model Input size m Param. Epochs Acctest
MNIST-3L 28x28x1 10 62,346 10 98.6
MNIST-5L 28x28x1 10 683,522 10 99.1
GTSRB-5L 32x32x3 43 669,123 50 91.7
CIFAR10-9L 32x32x3 10 ∼ 6 M 100 84.6
GTSRB-RN34 224x224x3 43 ∼ 21 M 250 98.1
CIFAR10-RN34 224x224x3 10 ∼ 21 M 250 94.7
Caltech-RN34 224x224x3 256 ∼ 21 M 250 74.4
In order to accurately reconstruct model extraction attacks, we
use the same model architectures and training process as in [21]
for low-capacity models and as in [33] for high-capacity models.
Similarly to prior work [33], we use ResNet34 [19] architecture
pre-trained on ImageNet as a basis for high-capacity models. We
fine-tuned Caltech-RN34, GTSRB-RN34 and CIFAR10-RN34 models
using Caltech256, GTSRB and CIFAR10 datasets respectively 1. We
also trained DenseNet121 [20] models to perform additional experi-
ments due to the absence of dropout layers in ResNet34 models. All
models were trained using Adam optimizer with learning rate of
0.001 that was decreased over time to 0.0005 (after 100 epochs for
ResNet34 models and half-way for the other), except for Caltech-
RN34. For Caltech-RN34, we used SGD optimizer with an initial
learning rate of 0.1 that was decreased by a factor of 10 every 60
epochs over 250 epochs. We used a batch size of 16 for fine-tuning
ResNet34 and DenseNet121 based models.
1We chose to reproduce only the Caltech-RN34 experiment from [33] because of its best
performance. We used CIFAR10 and GTSRB to conduct supplementary experiments
with high capacity models as they allow us to juxtapose results of experiments with
low and high capacity models on the same datasets.
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5.2 Watermarking Procedure
Inputs fromA’s dataset DA are submitted to the DAWN-enhanced
prediction API of FV which returns correct FV (x) or incorrect
predictions BV (x) according to the result of the watermarking
functionWV (x). For simplicity, we implementMV (x) as an identity
function in all our experiments. The evaluation and comparison
of different mapping methods is outside the scope of this paper.
We simulate A who uses the whole set DA , which includes |TA |
samples with incorrect labels, to train its surrogate model FA . A
trains FA without being aware of the watermarked samples in DA .
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
We use two metrics to evaluate the success of A’s goal and V’s
goal respectively. A’s goal is to train a surrogate model FA that
has maximum accuracy on FV ’s primary classification task. We
evaluate this by computing the test accuracy of the surrogate model
Acctest (FA ) on the test set Test of each dataset (cf. Tab. 7).
Acctest (FA ) = 1|Test |
∑
xi ∈T est
{
1, if FˆA (xi ) = Of (xi )
0, otherwise
(4)
V’s goal is to maximize the embedding of the watermark in any
surrogate model built from responses from FV such that its surro-
gacy can be reliably demonstrated. We evaluate this by computing
the watermark accuracy of the surrogate model Accwm (FA ) on the
trigger set TA of watermarked inputs.
Accwm (FA ) = 1|TA |
∑
xi ∈TA
{
1, if FˆA (xi ) = BˆV (xi )
0, otherwise
(5)
DAWN aims to maximizeAccwm (FA ) regardless ofAcctest (FA ).
A aims to maximize Acctest (FA ) while minimizing Accwm (FA ).
In our experiments, we calculate both metrics every 5 epochs in
order to evaluate their progress during the training process.
6 ROBUSTNESS OF WATERMARKING
We assessA’s ability to prevent the embedding of a watermark in a
surrogate model, i.e., to violate the unremovability requirementW1.
Prior work evaluated unremovability after a watermarked model
is trained showing that backoor-based watermarks are resilient
to model pruning and adversarial fine tuning [1, 31, 48]. DAWN
also embeds backdoor-based watermarks resilient to removal using
post-training manipulations. Thus, we focus on adversarial manip-
ulations during training by evaluating several solutions that could
prevent watermark embedding. We then evaluate the ability for A
to identify watermarked inputs using the trained surrogate model,
i.e., to violate the indistinguishability requirement X2.
We take an ideal model extraction attack scenario where FˆV =
Of is a perfect oracle.A has access to a large dataset DA of natural
samples from the same distribution asV training data: we use the
whole training set from each dataset (Tab. 7) forDA . We use a large
watermark of fixed size |TA | = 250 in all following experiments.
Embedding a large watermark is challenging since the model must
learn many isolated errors (mislabeled inputs). We take |TA | = 250
as an upper bound to the watermark size and a worst case scenario
for DAWN watermark embedding.
6.1 Unremovability of watermark during
training
We evaluate the impact of two parameters on embedding a water-
mark during DNN training. The first parameter is the capacity of
FA . A can limit this capacity such that the model could only learn
the primary classification task and cannot learn the watermark.
The second parameter is the use of regularization. Regularization
accommodates classification errors on the training data, which is
considered as noise. The watermark consists of incorrectly labeled
inputs which may be discarded using regularization.
We evaluate the impact of model capacity and regularization
on watermark accuracy Accwm and test accuracy Acctest of FA .
We trained several surrogate models having low and high capacity.
TA was randomly selected from the respective training sets. We
used plain training and two regularization methods, namely weight
decay [25] with decaying factor λ and dropout (DO=X) [38] with
probability X={0.3, 0.5}. We selected λ values optimal for A: such
that they maximize the difference Acctest −Accwm .
Table 3a and 3b present the results of this experiment for DNN
models with low and high capacity respectively. We report Accwm
andAcctest results at three training stages providing (1) best water-
mark accuracy (best forV), (2) best test accuracy (best for A) and
(3) when training is completed. Overall, we observe that Acctest
and Accwm are high for most settings. Using plain training, Accwm
is mostly higher than Acctest and often close to 100%. The own-
ership of all these surrogate models can be reliably demonstrated
using a low tolerated error rate, e.g., e = 0.3.
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of Accwm , Acctest and training
loss during the training of some selected surrogate models. Using
plain training, we see that watermark and test accuracy are closely
tied and Accwm is usually slightly higher than Acctest .
It is also worth noting that training a watermarked model is
slower than training a plain model. Training an accurate water-
marked MNIST-5L model requires 100 epochs while training the
same model without watermark requires 10 epochs (cf. Tab. 2). Nev-
ertheless this difference in training time cannot be exploited by
A to infer if the predictions it gets are watermarked or not. A
does not have an expected baseline training time prior to extract a
victim model. We can see that training time for a surrogate model
depends on the victim model, which is unknown to A (100 epochs
for MNIST-5L / 20 epochs for CIFAR-9L in Fig. 3).
Model capacity. High-capacity models can provide higher wa-
termark and test accuracy than low-capacity models as highlighted
by comparing results for GTSRB and CIFAR10 in both tables. While
Accwm is low for some low-capacitymodels, e.g., MNIST-3L,MNIST-
5L (DO), their test accuracy is similarly low and close to random
Accwm ∼ Acctest ∼ 10%. This shows that reducing the model ca-
pacity can prevent the embedding of the watermark. However, de-
creasing Accwm to a level where it cannot be used to reliably prove
ownership makes FA unusable.Accwm andAcctest are closely tied
when manipulating the model capacity and thus this is not a useful
strategy to circumvent DAWN.
Regularization. Regularization is useful for decreasing the wa-
termark accuracy in a few cases. Weight decay is useful for low-
capacity GTSRB-5L and CIFAR10-9L models. Dropout is useful
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Figure 3: Evolution of training loss, test (Acctest ) and wa-
termark accuracy (Accwm ) over 500 training epochs. MNIST-
5L and CIFAR10-9L are baseline models using plain train-
ing. Acctest and Accwm are tied and vary simultaneously.
The trained surrogatemodel embeds thewatermark.MNIST-
5L (DO=0.3) and CIFAR10-9L (λ = 3e−4) respectively use
dropout andweight decay.Acctest can be significantly higher
thanAccwm but its evolution is very unstable and it has large
variations despite the training loss remaining low. Obtain-
ing a usable non-watermarked surrogate model is challeng-
ing.
for low-capacity MNIST-5L and CIFAR10-9L models, and for high-
capacity Caltech-DN121 model. Dropout completely prevents the
embedding of the watermark into MNIST-5L model as depicted by
Accwm ∼ 10%. However, Acctest is also significantly reduced, by
50% at best, making FA potentially unusable. Figure 3 (MNIST-5L
(DO=0.3)) further highlights that the maximal test accuracy of 51%
is difficult to obtain sinceAcctest is very unstable along the training
process, changing abruptly from 10% to 50% while the training loss
remains constantly low. In all remaining cases, Accwm is reduced
down to 20-35%, while preserving high test accuracy similar to
models trained with non-watermarked datasets. While Accwm is
low, the watermark can still successfully demonstrate ownership by
increasing the tolerated error rate to, e.g., e = 0.8 > 1−Accwm . Con-
sidering the large watermark size of 250, this demonstration would
still be reliable despite the high tolerated error rate as evaluated in
Sect. 4.3.
It is worth noting that no regularization method is effective at
removing the watermark from high capacity GTSRB-RN34 and
CIFAR10-RN34 models. The likely reason is that ResNet34 architec-
ture has significant overcapacity for the primary task of classifying
these datasets. Regularization cannot limit this capacity to an extent
Table 3: Impact of regularization – dropout (DO) and weight
decay (λ) – on test (test ) and watermark accuracy (wm) of sur-
rogate models FA . We report results at the training epoch
(ep.) reaching best Accwm (optimal for V), best Acctest (op-
timal for A) and when training is over (Final). Green re-
sults highlight low Accwm and Acctest : FA is unusable. Red
results highlight low Accwm while Acctest remains signifi-
cantly high:V may fail to prove ownership of FA .
(a) Low capacity models. 500 training epochs.
Best Accwm Best Acctest Final
Model wm test ep. wm test ep. wm test
MNIST-3L 14% 11% - 14% 11% - 14% 11%
MNIST-3L (DO=0.3) 12% 11% - 12% 11% - 12% 11%
MNIST-3L (DO=0.5) 13% 11% - 13% 11% - 13% 11%
MNIST-3L (λ = 5e−6) 99% 89% 210 98% 96% 290 97% 96%
MNIST-5L 99% 96% 120 98% 97% 170 98% 97%
MNIST-5L (DO=0.3) 13% 16% 50 11% 51% 30 12% 11%
MNIST-5L (DO=0.5) 13% 17% 15 9% 53% 50 11% 13%
MNIST-5L (λ = 5e−6) 99% 88% 215 99% 94% 365 98% 93%
GTSRB-5L 97% 88% 160 95% 89% 190 97% 88%
GTSRB-5L (DO=0.3) 99% 88% 135 98% 90% 220 98% 88%
GTSRB-5L (DO=0.5) 98% 89% 105 98% 90% 200 98% 89%
GTSRB-5L (λ = 5e−6) 28% 55% 410 17% 71% 105 25% 79%
CIFAR10-9L 93% 78% 110 92% 79% 105 73% 76%
CIFAR10-9L (DO=0.3) 40% 75% 125 35% 75% 90 25% 70%
CIFAR10-9L (DO=0.5) 45% 71% 240 25% 77% 90 25% 75%
CIFAR10-9L (λ = 3e−4) 32% 72% 235 32% 72% 235 25% 47%
(b) High capacity models. 250 training epochs.
Best Accwm Best Acctest Final
Model wm test ep. wm test ep. wm test
GTSRB-RN34 83% 97% 245 70% 98% 105 84% 97%
GTSRB-DN121 (DO=0.3) 98% 89% 240 98% 89% 240 95% 86%
GTSRB-DN121 (DO=0.5) 99% 92% 235 98% 93% 245 98% 93%
GTSRB-RN34 (λ = e−5) 87% 92% 200 87% 92% 200 73% 77%
CIFAR10-RN34 99% 89% 110 99% 90% 240 98% 89%
CIFAR10-DN121 (DO=0.3) 99% 88% 160 98% 88% 210 97% 86%
CIFAR10-DN121 (DO=0.5) 99% 85% 130 97% 88% 220 98% 87%
CIFAR10-RN34 (λ = e−5) 100% 80% 10 100% 89% 160 97% 81%
Caltech-RN34 97% 69% 110 93% 73% 160 94% 73%
Caltech-DN121 (DO=0.3) 48% 44% 110 36% 59% 155 32% 57%
Caltech-DN121 (DO=0.5) 35% 30% 115 22% 49% 185 21% 49%
Caltech-RN34 (λ = 3e−4) 89% 67% 100 69% 68% 60 76% 68%
where the watermark would not be embedded. This meansA needs
sufficient knowledge of FV to select an appropriate model architec-
ture for FA . It must have sufficient capacity to learn the primary
classification task of the victim model while preventing watermark
embedding. In model extraction attacks, A has black-box access to
FV , which forces to use FA with sufficient capacity to maximize
the attack success [33]. In this setting, regularization is not useful
to circumvent DAWN.
Finally, while regularization can be useful,A needs relevant test
data and ground truth to optimize the regularization parameters
(e.g., decaying factor λ). Also, we observed in Fig. 3 that test accu-
racy is very unstable while the training loss remains constantly low
when using regularization. A needs additional labeled test data to
apply early stopping [5] of training at the optimal epoch providing
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Table 4: Resistance ofMV to perturbations δ of various size
for the MNIST dataset.
Entire DA TA only
same FˆV diff FˆV same FˆV diff FˆV
δ sameMV diffMV sameMV diffMV
0.2 99.30% 0.44% 0.26% 73.88% 13.55% 12.57%
0.1 99.63% 0.24% 0.13% 85.12% 7.52% 7.36%
0.09 99.64% 0.22% 0.14% 85.70% 8.01% 6.29%
0.075 99.71% 0.19% 0.10% 88.84% 4.55% 6.61%
0.05 99.81% 0.12% 0.07% 92.98% 3.97% 3.05%
maximal test accuracy. In all extraction attacks [9, 21, 33, 34, 42]
the availability of relevant data is the main limitation. All this data
is typically used for training the surrogate model and none is used
for test purposes, which prevents optimization of regularization
parameters and early stopping.
A third parameter that may impact watermark embedding is
the distribution of watermarked inputs. In contrast to prior DNN
watermarking solutions[1, 31, 48], DAWN uses watermarked inputs
from the same distribution as the training data. The watermark
distribution cannot be controlled by A.
6.2 Detection of Watermarked Inputs
A can try to identify watermarked inputs and remove them from
DA prior to training in order to prevent watermark embedding. Be-
cause DAWN relies on a hash to decide if an input is watermarked,
A can query multiple perturbed versions of inputs in DA and dis-
card those that return different predictions. The mapping function
MV presented in Sect. 4.1.3 is meant to prevent this evasion. We
evaluate the effectiveness ofMV by querying 10 perturbed versions
of each of the 10,000 samples in DA , which includes |TA | = 121.
For each query, we check whether they get consistent mapping
MV and classification FˆV . Table 4 reports the results of this ex-
periment for various perturbation size δ for the MNIST dataset.
We distinguish cases where 1 FˆV (x) = FˆV (x + δ ) (same FˆV ) or
FˆV (x) , FˆV (x + δ ) (diff FˆV ); 2 MV (x) = MV (x + δ ) (sameMV )
orMV (x) , MV (x + δ ) (diffMV ). Same FˆV and sameMV means
A keeps a watermarked sample in DA (MV succeeds). Same FˆV
and differentMV means A discards a watermarked sample from
DA (MV fails). Different FˆV means A wrongfully discards a sam-
ple from DA regardless of MV (δ is too large and changes FV ’s
prediction). We see MV succeeds to provide a consistent mapping
in over 85% cases for δ ≤ 0.1, meaning 85% of theTA is preserved in
DA . As perturbations δ increase in size,MV returns an increasing
rate of inconsistent mapping, but this rate is similar to the one of
changed predictions from FV . Thus, we concludeMV is resilient
to perturbations and DAWN can effectively watermark FA .
Alternatively, several techniques can identify if a DNN model
has a backdoor [6, 18, 45]. Most techniques like Neural Cleanse [45]
and TABOR [18] can only detect backdoors for which the trigger is
a static pattern added to original inputs (e.g., yellow square added
to an image). In contrast, our trigger set is composed of unmodified
samples having only incorrect labels. Consequently, technique like
Neural Cleanse and TABOR are ineffective at detecting DAWN’s
watermark. In App. B, we evaluate one technique [6] that claims to
be effective at identifying a trigger set TA in the entire training set
DA . We show that DAWN’s watermarks are undetectable by this
technique, which is not more effective than randomly discarding
some portion of DA .
7 PROTECTING AGAINST MODEL
EXTRACTION ATTACKS
We evaluateDAWN’s effectiveness at watermarking surrogate DNN
models constructed using two model extraction attacks presented
in App. C. The PRADA attack [21] achieves state-of-the-art per-
formance in extracting low-capacity DNN models primarily using
synthetic data and we launch it against MNIST-5L, GTSRB-5L and
CIFAR10-9L. The KnockOff attack [33] extracts high-capacity DNN
models using only natural data and we launch it against GTSRB-
RN34, CIFAR10-RN34 and Caltech-RN34. The test accuracy of each
FA extracted with these respective attacks is reported in Tab. 6.
We demonstrate how to setup DAWN to protect a given victim
model FV . We evaluate the successful embedding of watermarks
in several surrogate models FA as well as their utility considering
a circumvention strategy.
7.1 Effectiveness of DAWN
Watermarking decision: DAWN degrades FV utility by a factor
equal to rw ×Acc(FV ) due to incorrect predictions for watermarked
inputs. The value of rw is specific to FV . Given a desired level of
confidence for reliable ownership demonstration equal to 1−P(L <
e) (cf. Eq. 3), a tolerated error rate e and the number of classesm
for FV , we can compute the minimum size for the watermark |TA |
using Eq. 3. Given that V can estimate the minimum number of
queries N required by A to train a usable surrogate model for FV ,
we can compute rw = N /|TA |. This ratio ensures that if A can
successfully train a usable surrogate model FA , then FA will embed
a watermark large enough to reliably demonstrate its ownership .
The probability for successful trivial watermark verification
P(L < e) is valid for testing a single watermark. This probabil-
ity increases by a factor equal to the number of tested watermarks.
DAWN creates and registers client-specific watermarks.V must
estimate the number of API clients to calculate the actual proba-
bility for trivial demonstration of ownership considering that all
registered watermarks should be tested. When verifying a water-
mark, the judge J counts the number of registered watermarks
for FV in the public bulletin. J computes the real probability for
successful trivial watermark verification accordingly and decides if
a demonstration of ownership is reliable or not according to this
final confidence.
Utility for legitimate clients: Suppose we want a confidence for
reliable demonstration of ownership equal to 1 − 2−64. FV has a
prediction API with 1M API clients (1M watermarks are registered
for FV ). We need P(L < e) < 10−6 × 2−64 = 5.4 × 10−26 to be
able to test all registered watermarks while achieving our targeted
confidence. We choose a tolerated error rate e = 0.5. Table 5 reports
the computed watermark ratio rw required to protect six models
against model extraction.We see rw must always be lower than 0.5%
to reach 1− 2−64 confidence for any victim model. FV ’s accuracy is
thus degraded in a negligible manner that does not impact its utility.
DAWN meets the reliabilityW2 and utility X1 requirements.
9
Table 5: Ratio of watermarked inputs rw required to protect
six victim models FV from extraction attack (PRADA for 3
first models / KnockOff for 3 last). Prediction API with 1M
clients and targeted confidence for reliable demonstration
of ownership = 1 − 2−64. Number of attack queries (N ) ob-
tained from [21, 33] and used to compute the watermark
size |TA |. FV test accuracy decreases in a negligible manner
(rw < 0.5%) that does not impact its utility.
Model classes queries (N ) |TA | rw (%) New Acc(FV )
MNIST-5L 10 25,600 109 (0.1MB) 0.426 98.7%
GTSRB-5L 43 25,520 47 (0.4MB) 0.184 91.5%
CIFAR10-9L 10 160,000 109 (0.6MB) 0.068 84.5%
GTSRB-RN34 43 100,000 47 (1.7MB) 0.047 98.1%
CIFAR10-RN34 10 100,000 109 (3.9MB) 0.109 94.6%
Caltech-RN34 256 100,000 27 (1.0MB) 0.027 74.4%
Table 6: Efficacy of DAWN to defend against PRADA and
KnockOff model extraction attacks. Baseline gives the test
accuracy Acctest of the victim FV and surrogate model FA
trained without DAWN in place. FA with DAWN provides
Acctest and watermark accuracy Accwm of FA when DAWN
protects FV . All FA have high Accwm > 0.6 allowing success-
ful demonstration of ownership.
Baseline Acctest FA with DAWN
Attack Model FV FA Acctest Accwm
MNIST-5L 98.71% 95% 78.93% 100.00%
PRADA GTSRB-5L 91.50% 61.00% 61.43% 98.23%
CIFAR10-9L 84.53% 60.03% 60.95% 71.17%
GTSRB-RN34 98.42% 97.43% 97.72% 100.00%
KnockOff CIFAR10-RN34 94.66% 88.27% 88.41% 100.00%
Caltech-RN34 74.62% 72.74% 71.98% 93.54%
Overhead: Storing 1Mwatermarkswould require atmost a fewTBs
(cf. Tab. 5). Watermark verification consists in obtaining predictions
from a purported surrogate model. It is operated by J who gets
predictions at no monetary cost. Thus, demonstration of ownership
is only a matter of time and getting one prediction from our most
complex model (Caltech-RN34) takes 9ms (on Tesla P100 GPU).
Verifying one watermark for this model takes 0.25s (27 queries) and
verifying 100,000 watermarks takes 7 hours using a single GPU.
J can initially verify all watermarks with a lower confidence to
reduce this time (by testing only a subset of each watermark). Only
successful verification would later undergo a verification of the full
watermark. Testing the same 100,000 watermarks with 1 − 2−16
targeted confidence (instead of 1 − 2−64) requires 1h15 (5 samples
per watermark). This time can further be reduced by parallelizing
predictions on several GPUs.
7.2 Effectiveness against real extraction attacks
We want to show that any surrogate FA of a victim model FV
protected by DAWN will embed a watermark that allows for re-
liable demonstration of ownership. We evaluate the effectiveness
of DAWN against two landmark model extraction attacks namely
PRADA and KnockOff, presented in Sect. C.
Low-capacity models expose a prediction API that returns pre-
diction classes FˆV required for the PRADA attack. High-capacity
models return the full probability vector FV . Each victim model
is protected by DAWN using the setting presented in Sect. 7.1.
This setting enables V to demonstrate ownership of each surro-
gate model with confidence 1 − 2−64 using a tolerated error rate
e = 0.5. For demonstration of ownership to be successful, the
surrogate model FA must pass the watermark verification test
L(TA , BˆV (TA ), FA ) < e . In our setting, it means that DAWN suc-
cessfully defends against an extraction attack if the watermark
accuracy for FA is larger than 50%, i.e., Accwm (FA ) > 1 − e .
Table 6 presents the result of this experiment. We see all sur-
rogate models have a watermark accuracy Accwm ≥ 66%, which
meansV is successful in demonstrating their ownership. DAWN
successfully defends against the PRADA and KnockOff attacks for
all tested models while incurring little decrease in FV ’s utility (eval-
uated in Sect. 7.1). It is also worth noting that in all cases except
for MNIST-5L, DAWN does not degrade the test accuracy of FA .
We have shown DAWN effectively embeds a watermark in sur-
rogate models FA stolen using extraction attacks. In Appendix D,
we evaluate the resilience of DAWN’s watermark to removal using
three attacks: (1) double-extraction of a second order surrogate model
F ′A , (2) fine-tuning [23] and (3) pruning [4]. We show that pruning
removes the watermark while sacrificing the test accuracy for the
surrogate model. Double-extraction and fine-tuning can remove
the watermark while preserving test accuracy given that A has
unlimited access to natural data. However, DAWN defeats all three
attacks when A has limited access to data, which is the case for
most model extraction attack scenarios (cf. Sect. 2.2). A’s access to
data is limited in many scenarios, e.g., medical imaging classifiers,
where these removal attacks would be ineffective.
7.3 Resilience to distributed extraction attack
Distributing a model extraction attack across several API clients
means several adversaries Ai query a subset DAi from the whole
set DA used to train the surrogate model FA . Recall that DAWN is
a deterministic mechanism Sect. 4.1. The watermarkingWV and
backdoor BV functions are deterministic and specific to FV . Their
results only depend on the input queried to FV . The responses to
DA , and its corresponding trigger set, remain the same regardless
of which client(s) query the prediction API. Thus, DA is labeled in
the same manner and it includes the same trigger set TA whether
it is queried by one or by multiple API clients. Thus, the watermark
in FA trained using DA will remain indistinguishable X2 and
unremovableW1 even if multiple clients collude.
Note that in the case of colluding clients, each adversaryAi has a
subsetTAi of the whole trigger setTA . When verifying ownership,
the judge J will have several successful watermark verifications
L(TAi ,BV (TAi ), FA ) < e : one for each adversaryAi who colluded
to build the surrogate model FA . The verification of each sub-
watermark (TAi ,BV (TAi )) has the same expectation for success
as the verification of the whole watermark (TA ,BV (TA )). J will
conclude that each API client i whose watermark is successfully
verified is a perpetrator of the distributed extraction attack used
to build the surrogate model FA . LinkabilityW4 remains valid in
case of collusion.
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In a distributed attack, the watermark associated to each collud-
ing client is smaller than in a centralized attack. To verify ownership
with a same reliability, we must increase the watermark size and
consequently rw by a factor equal to the number of colluding clients.
We assume the number of real colluding clients is limited, e.g., a
few tens. Nevertheless, it is possible to mount a Sybil attack in
which several API accounts are created by a single adversary. The
API account registration process must require providing informa-
tion that maximizes difficulty of creating trusted accounts, e.g.,
verified phone number or credit card, to mitigate this threat. Also,
Sybils-detection techniques exist [43, 46] and it is possible to link
Sybils accounts by examining querying patterns and IP addresses
for instance [40]. For example, to protect Caltech-RN34, we could
increase rw to reliably verify the watermark of 35 colluders while
maintaining the utility loss below 1%.
8 DISCUSSION
In Appendix F, we summarize how DAWN satisfies requirements
introduced in Sec. 3.4. Here we discuss limitations of DAWN.
A can attempt to prevent ownership demonstration for FA by
ensuring that watermark verification (Eq. 2) fails. This entails reduc-
ing the watermark accuracy by training FA using only a subset of
the trigger set TA . Since watermarked inputs are indistinguishable
(X2) and uniformly distributed in DA , A cannot selectively dis-
card them. Nevertheless,A can discard x% of the whole DA , which
statistically, will result in x% of watermarked input being discarded.
This should reduce Accwm (FA ) by 100 − x%. If x is high enough,
the resulting Accwm (FA ) can be brought down low enough for
watermark verification to systematically fail.
While this strategy is effective, it deprives A from a large part
of DA . This decreases Acctest (FA ) and consequently the utility
of FA (Appendix D). Alternatively, A must collect a set DA x%
larger and make x% more queries to FV to compensate for later
discarded training inputs. We already discussed in Sect 2.2 that
access to relevant data is the main limitation for A. The secondary
goal ofA is to limit the number of queries to FV (cf. Sect. 3.1). This
evasion strategy requires more adversarial capabilities (access to
data) and it compromises one adversary goal (minimum number
of queries). Consequently, even if effective, we do not consider it a
realistic evasion strategy.
Another potential limitation of DAWN is circumvention of the
mapping functionMV (Sec. 4.1.3). If mapping is too aggressive, A
may probe the input space and try to identify subspaces that are
grouped together. However, this is not guaranteed to work because
the behavior of the model on synthetic samples is undefined [15].
MV impacts only the watermarking decisionWV and not the re-
turned label -A cannot interact directly with the mapping function.
On the other hand, if the tolerated modification δ is too small, A
might identify watermarked queries by submitting several samples
with minor modifications and taking the majority vote of the label.
We evaluated this attack in Sect. 6.2 showing that mappings from
MV are as consistent as predictions from FV . Semantic-preserving
modifications to image queries (e.g., translation, rotation, change in
color intensity, etc,) could be used to improve this attack. However,
by using an embedding from FV to implementMV , both functions
should be as resilient to semantic-preserving modifications.
Finally,A can try to detect when J is making queries to demon-
strate ownership by checking if they are part of DA used to steal
FV . This search can be implemented efficiently by building a hash
table of DA . However, in Appendix E, we show that we can query
noisy versions of samples in TA while maintaining Accwm (FA )
(c.f. Table 13). To identify these samples, A needs to compute their
distance to every samples in DA . For a DA containing 100,000 Im-
ageNet samples, this computation is over 100 times more expensive
than checking a hash table and it can take over 7 seconds per query,
which is not feasible (c.f. Table 14).
9 RELATEDWORK
Watermarking DNN models. The first watermarking technique
for DNNs [44] explicitly embeds additional information into the
weights of a DNN after it is trained. Verifying the watermark re-
quires white-box access to themodel in order to analyze the weights.
A limitation of this approach is that the watermark can be easily
removed by minimally retraining the watermarked model.
Alternative approaches [1, 10, 31, 48] that are more robust have
been proposed, where the watermark can be verified in a black-
box setting. These are based on backdooring and they allow for
watermark extraction using only a prediction API, as discussed in
Sect. 2.3. These approaches use both a carefully selected trigger set
and a specific training process chosen by the model owner. The first
proposal for such approach [31] consist in modifying the original
model boundary using adversarial retraining [29] in order to make
the model unique. The watermark is composed of synthetically
generated adversarial samples [15] that are close to the decision
boundary. The impact of selecting a particular distribution for a
watermark has been evaluated in [48]. It shows that selecting a
trigger set from the same distribution as the training data (albeit
with minor synthetic modifications) or from a different distribution,
does not affect the accuracy of the model for its primary classifica-
tion task or on its training time, while the watermark gets perfectly
embedded. Finally, more formal foundations and theoretical guar-
antees for backdoor-based DNN watermarking have been provided
in [1]. This work empirically assesses that the removability of a
DNN watermark is highly dependent on the training process of the
watermarked model (training from scratch vs. re-training).
In contrast to prior DNN watermarking techniques for black-box
verification [1, 10, 31, 48], DAWN considers a victim who (a) does
not control the training of the DNN model and (b) cannot select a
trigger set T from the whole input space Rn . DAWN dynamically
embeds a watermark in queries made to a model prediction API.
Thus, DAWN defends against model extraction attacks and enables
a model owner to identify surrogates of its model.
Defenses against model extraction. It was suggested that the
distribution of queries made during an extraction attack is different
from benign queries [21]. Hence, model extraction can be detected
using density estimation methods, namely by assessing the abil-
ity for queries to fit a Gaussian distribution or not. However, this
technique protects only against attacks using synthetic queries and
is not effective against, e.g., the KnockOff attack. Other detection
methods analyse subsequent queries close to the classes’ decision
boundaries [36] or queries exploring abnormally large region of
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the input space [22]. Both methods are effective but detect only ex-
traction attacks against decision trees. They are ineffective against
complex models like DNNs. Altering predictions returned to API
clients can mitigate model extraction attacks. Predictions can be
restricted to classes [42] or adversarially modified to degrade the
performance of the surrogate model [27]. However, some extrac-
tion attacks [21] circumvent such defenses because they remain
effective using just prediction classes.
Prior defenses to model extraction are designed to protect only
simple models [22, 36] or to prevent only specific extraction at-
tacks [27]. It is arguable if a generic defense would ever be effec-
tive at detecting/preventing model extraction. Consequently, with
DAWN we take a different approach where we assume a surro-
gate model can be extracted. Then we propose a generic defense to
identify surrogate DNN models that have been extracted from any
victim model using any extraction attack.
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A DATASETS AND MODELS
Table 7 presents the characteristics of the datasets we used in our
experiments. These are divided into a training and a testing set.
Images were resized to fit the corresponding model architectures
used in prior work. Table 8 presents model architectures used for
conducting experiments with low capacity models - the perfect-
knowledge attacker in Sect. 6.1 and reproduction of the PRADA [21]
attack in Sect. 7.2.
Table 7: Image datasets used to evaluate DAWN. Different
sample sizes are input to different models.
Number of samples
Dataset Sample Size Classes Train Test
MNIST 28x28 10 60,000 10,000
GTSRB 32x32 / 224x224 43 39,209 12,630
CIFAR10 32x32 / 224x224 10 50,000 10,000
Caltech 224x224 256 23,703 6,904
ImageNet 224x224 1000 100,000 -
B DETECTINGWATERMARKED INPUTS
We assess if watermarked inputs can be identified such thatA could
remove them from the DA before training the surrogate model.
This defense consists in first training a DNN model with the
whole training dataset. Then, training data is predicted using the
trained model and we record the activations of the last hidden
layer of the DNN model. These activations are projected to three
dimensions using Independent Component Analysis (ICA) and clus-
tered into two clusters using k-means. These clusters are expected
to group benign training data and poisoned data (watermarked
inputs) respectively. The intuition for this approach is that incor-
rectly labeled inputs (watermark) trigger different activations than
correctly labeled inputs in the trained DNN model. The size and
silhouette score [37] of the two clusters are analyzed to conclude
(1) if there is backdoor in the model and (2) which training inputs
compose the backdoor. According to authors, a low silhouette score
(0.1/0.15) and a high difference in relative cluster size is expected if
the model embeds a watermark. The smallest cluster should contain
the watermarked inputs.
To evaluate this defense against DAWN, we trained two sets of
DNN models, plain models using a correctly labeled training set
only, and watermarked models each embedding a watermark of size
Table 8: Model architectures of low capacity models.
Layer MNIST-3L MNIST-5L GTSRB-5L CIFAR10-9L
1 conv2-32 conv2-32 conv2-64 conv2-32
maxpool2d maxpool2d maxpool2d batchnorm2d
ReLU ReLU ReLU ReLU
2 conv2-64 conv2-64 conv2-128 conv2-64
maxpool2d maxpool2d maxpool2d ReLU
ReLU ReLU ReLU maxpool2d
3 dropout conv2-128 dropout conv2-128
FC-10 maxpool2d FC-200 batchnorm2d
Softmax ReLU ReLU ReLU
4 dropout dropout conv2-128
FC-200 FC-100 ReLU
ReLU ReLU maxpool2d
5 dropout dropout dropout
FC-10 FC-43 conv2-256
Softmax Softmax batchnorm2d
ReLU
6 conv2-256
ReLU
maxpool2d
7 dropout
FC-1024
ReLU
8 FC-512
ReLU
9 dropout
FC-10
Softmax
Table 9: Results of watermark detection [6] on several wa-
termarked (wm) and plainmodels (Nowm). Relative size rep-
resents the average ratio of training inputs (DA ) contained
in the small cluster (supposed to contain watermarked in-
puts only). wm split counts watermarked inputs in the
small/large clusters (|TA | = 250). Silhouette score [37] is av-
eraged over all classes. Small clusters are much larger than
the size of thewatermark.Mostwatermarked inputs are con-
tained in large clusters. Silhouette score for both plain and
watermarked models is above the recommended detection
threshold (0.15). DAWN’s watermark cannot be detected.
Relative size wm Silhouette score
Model wm Nowm split wm Nowm
MNIST-5L 0.222 0.449 55/195 0.47 ± 0.33 0.23 ± 0.06
GTSRB-5L 0.059 0.098 59/191 0.64 ± 0.18 0.76 ± 0.20
CIFAR10-9L 0.094 0.105 3/247 0.79 ± 0.18 0.78 ± 0.19
GTSRB-RN34 0.409 0.419 92/158 0.26 ± 0.09 0.24 ± 0.02
CIFAR10-RN34 0.378 0.338 79/171 0.24 ± 0.01 0.27 ± 0.04
Caltech-RN34 0.425 0.422 124/126 0.24 ± 0.02 0.24 ± 0.02
Overall 0.264 0.305 67/183 0.44 0.42
|TA | = 250. We applied the watermark detection process discussed
above on these models and report results in Tab. 9. Clustering is not
13
Figure 4: Last activation (three independent components)
for inputs predicted “1” by MNIST-5L watermarked model
(top) and “4” by GTSRB-5L watermarked model (bottom).
Left: Ground truth watermarked inputs (red cross) and cor-
rectly labeled inputs (blue dots). Right: Clustering results of
watermark detection (two clusters: blue dots / green trian-
gles). Watermarked inputs are mixed with correctly labeled
inputs and clusters cannot isolate the watermark.
able to isolate watermarked inputs into a single cluster; the main
part of watermarked inputs belongs to large clusters. The recom-
mendation [6] to discard small clusters from training would deprive
DA from a large number of correctly labeled samples while a large
part of the watermark would be preserved. Using this approach, the
defense wrongly discards 26.4% of clean data from DA on average
while detecting only 67 out of 250 watermarked samples (26.8% of
TA ). The silhouette score is not useful for detecting the watermark
either since watermarked and plain models have close scores that
are all above the recommended detection threshold (0.1/0.15) [6].
Our plain models are detected as embedding a watermark using this
defense. We conclude that this defense is ineffective at detecting
watermarks generated by DAWN.
We assume the reason for this ineffectiveness is due to the nature
of our watermark, selected from the same distribution as the train-
ing set. In contrast to prior DNN watermarking solutions [1, 31, 48],
our watermarked inputs do not come from a single manifold distant
from the training data manifold. Consequently the model does not
learn a “single” activation that generalizes to the whole watermark
but rather learns individual exceptions for each watermarked input.
The activations of watermarked inputs are thus different from each
other and they are scattered among the activations of the remaining
training data (correctly labeled). This can be observed in Fig. 4 -
left, where we see that watermarked inputs are scattered among
correctly labeled inputs. This explains why generated clusters can-
not isolate watermarked inputs from correctly labeled inputs (Fig. 4
- right).
C MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS
CONSIDERED
We selected two model extraction attacks to evaluate DAWN.
PRADA is an iterative model extraction attack that consists of
several duplication rounds. Each round is composed of three steps:
1 querying FV , 2 training FA with obtained predictions FV (x)
and 3 crafting new synthetic queries using the updated FA . A
first queries FV with natural queries called seed samples. Then, it
crafts synthetic queries for which predictions are used to refine
FA ’s decision boundary. This means DA is built iteratively as FA
is retrained and refined. PRADA uses prediction classes FˆV (x)
to train FA . We launch the PRADA attack against low-capacity
models MNIST-5L, GTSRB-5L and CIFAR10-9L. Following the setup
of Juuti et al. [21], we use the same model architecture for both FV
and FA , and FA is trained from scratch. We use 10 natural seed
samples per class to attack MNIST-5L and GTSRB-5L, we perform
8 and 6 duplication rounds respectively, using respectively TRND
and COLOR synthetic sample generation strategy. PRADA is not
evaluated against CIFAR10-9L in prior work [21]. We use 1000
natural seed samples per class, 4 duplication rounds using TRND to
train FA having a satisfactory accuracy.
KnockOff is a model extraction attack to steal image classifica-
tion DNN models. It queries natural image inputs coming from a
distribution that is independent of the distribution of V’s train-
ing set. All queries (DA ) and their predictions are used to retrain
(fine-tune) a high-capacity pre-trained DNN model. Knockoff uses
full probability vector FV (x) to retrain the surrogate model. We
launch the KnockOff attack against high-capacity models GTSRB-
RN34, CIFAR10-RN34 and Caltech-RN34. Following the setup of
Orekondy et al. [33], we use ResNet34 architecture with ImageNet
pre-trained weights as basis for FA . Then, FA is fine-tuned using
100,000 queries (DA ) sampled from the ImageNet dataset. For fine
tuning, we use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum
of 0.5 for 200 epochs. We chose an initial learning rate of 0.1 which
is decayed every 60 epochs by a factor of 10.
As it is observed in Tab. 6, surrogate models have a test accuracy
that is significantly lower (15-30 percentage points -pp) than their
victim counterparts in all cases except for MNIST-5L and GTSRB-
RN34. Model extraction attacks induce a decrease in accuracy [21,
33, 34] and our results are comparable to those obtained in prior
work [21, 33].
D WATERMARK REMOVAL
Double extraction and fine-tuning. A watermark may be re-
moved by performing an extraction attack against FA to obtain a
second order surrogate model F ′A . A has full control over FA : its
prediction API is not protected by DAWN and does not intention-
ally return incorrect prediction. IfA uses a disjoint set of queries to
extract a surrogate F ′A from FA , then F
′
A may not embed the water-
mark, preventing the demonstration of its ownership byV . Instead
of starting the second extraction from scratch, it can use FA as the
14
starting point for FA′ and fine-tune it. We call this stealing+fine-
tuning.
We observed in Tab. 6 that surrogate models have a lower accu-
racy than victim models because model extraction incurs a neces-
sary decrease in surrogate model accuracy. We evaluate the extent
of the decrease inAcctest andAccwm ifA launches two successive
extraction attacks instead of one or steals+fine-tunes the model
to obtain F ′A : the first against FV and the second against FA . We
evaluate these evasion techniques using the PRADA and KnockOff
attacks.
The two successive extraction attacks and stealing+fine-tuning
are performed in the same conditions as described in Sect. C. The
only difference is thatA uses half the seed samples for each PRADA
attack (5 per class for MNIST-5L and GTSRB-5L, 500 per class for
CIFAR10-9L) and runs an additional duplication round to query the
same number of inputs. The number of seed samples is a limited
adversarial capability in PRADA [21], so we grant A with the
same capability for single and double extraction attack. For each
KnockOff attack, A uses a different set of 100,000 inputs from
ImageNet. For the second extraction attack (against FA ), we query
the same number of inputs as for the first one. While this number
can be increased, we empirically observed that the test accuracy
of F ′A reaches its maximum and stagnates before the PRADA and
KnockOff attacks finish, i.e., more queries do not improve Acctest
of F ′A .
Table 10: Double extraction attack: test accuracy Acctest for
the victimmodel FV , first order surrogatemodel FA and sec-
ond order surrogate model F ′A . Watermark accuracy Accwm
for F ′A and Increase in Acctest degradation (Degrad.) be-
tween FA and F ′A compared to between FV and FA . Double
extraction can remove DAWN’s watermark from F ′A but it
incurs a significant additional degradation in test accuracy
(20-80%). Test accuracy of F ′A for the PRADA attack is too
low for it to be useful.
FV FA F ′A (2
nd extraction)
Model Acctest Acctest Acctest Accwm Degrad.
MNIST-5L 98.7% 71.10% 49.06% (-49pp) 11.11% +80%
GTSRB-5L 91.5% 50.66% 29.51% (-62pp) 3.36% +52%
CIFAR10-9L 84.5% 45.7% 37.80% (-44pp) 3.04% +20%
GTSRB-RN34 98.42% 97.72% 97.30% (-1pp) 17.64% +71%
CIFAR10-RN34 94.66% 88.41% 84.85% (-10pp) 11.88% +57%
Caltech-RN34 74.62% 71.98% 70.95% (-4pp) 9.67% +39%
As it can be observed in Tab. 10 and 11, double extraction attack
and stealing+fine-tuning effectively remove thewatermark from the
second order surrogate model F ′A . The watermark accuracy is low
enough (3-22%) to fail demonstration of ownership for F ′A , which
empirically confirms that prior DNN watermarking techniques are
not resilient to this class of model extraction attacks [48].
While removing the watermark, the extraction of the second
order surrogate model using these attacks also increases the degra-
dation in test accuracy by 20% to 80% for F ′A compared to FA .
Considering a powerful A having unlimited access to natural data
(e.g., KnockOff adversary model) the extraction of the first order
Table 11: Stealing+fine-tuning attack: test accuracy Acctest
for the victimmodel FV , surrogatemodel FA and fine-tuned
surrogatemodel F ′A . Watermark accuracyAccwm for F
′
A and
increase inAcctest degradation (Degrad.) between FA and F ′A
compared to between FV and FA . Fine-tuning can remove
DAWN’s watermark from F ′A but it incurs additional degra-
dation in test accuracy (20-60%). Test accuracy of F ′A for the
PRADA attack is too low for it to be useful.
FV FA F ′A (fine-tuning)
Model Acctest Acctest Acctest Accwm Degrad.
MNIST-5L 98.7% 71.10% 63.67% (-35pp) 22.22% +27%
GTSRB-5L 91.5% 50.66% 42.09% (-49pp) 9.24% +21%
CIFAR10-9L 84.5% 45.7% 38.41% (-46pp) 4.06% +19%
GTSRB-RN34 98.42% 97.72% 97.22% (-1pp) 7.81% +60%
CIFAR10-RN34 94.66% 88.41% 84.93% (-10pp) 16.83% +56%
Caltech-RN34 74.62% 71.98% 70.81% (-4pp) 22.58% +44%
surrogate model incurs little accuracy degradation and so does the
extraction of the second order surrogate model. The final model
F ′A stolen using KnockOff attack has its watermark removed and
preserves its utility (from -1pp to -10pp compared to FV ). DAWN
cannot protect model extraction attacks where A has unlimited
access to natural data. However, A’s access to data is limited in
many scenarios, e.g., access to medical imaging that are privacy
sensitive, and highly specialized models may not return meaningful
predictions to random images. In such a scenario, the KnockOff
attack may not be effective and the PRADA attack is more effective.
We see that for the PRADA attack the test accuracy of F ′A decreases
sharply during each attack that removes the watermark (3 top rows
in Tab. 10 and 11) . In most cases, the final test accuracy of F ′A is
less than half of FV (from -35pp to -62pp) and we consider that
Acc(F ′A ) ≪ Acc(FV )makes F ′A too inaccurate to be useful. DAWN
can effectively protect against extraction attack using a limited
amount of data by destroying the utility of a model F ′A deprived
from watermark.
Pruning. Alternatively, A may attempt to prune the model by
setting random weights of the model to zero. In our experiments we
prune weights uniformly randomly. We show that for large values
of δ pruning is effective at removing the watermark but it sacrifices
models utility and renders it useless (c.f. Table 12). Furthermore,
we observe that Acctest and Accwm do not fall proportionally i.e.
there is no guarantee that sacrificing X% Acctest results in the
same drop inAccwm . Also, our experiments show that determining
appropriate δ without knowing TA is challenging as there is no
consistent drop in accuracy for a particular value of δ across all
models.
E NOISY WATERMARK VERIFICATION
A having deployed FA and being aware of DAWN can try to
prevent watermark verification performed by J . A can check if
queries to FA belong to DA used to steal FV , and return different
predictions for them. We evaluated that searching DA for exact
matches can be done efficiently using a hash table (28-44ms addi-
tional overhead per query for our datasets). Hashing the query is
the most time consuming part of this search.
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Table 12: Acctest and Accwm of pruned stolen models FA . δ
denotes the percentage of weights set to zero.
δ (%)
Model 0 25 40 50 75 90
MNIST-5L Acctest 78.93% 78.57% 78.31% 77.76% 71.24% 43.84%
Accwm 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 61.50% 7.69%
GTSRB-5L Acctest 61.43% 54.24% 43.80% 30.57% 3.81% 3.80%
Accwm 98.23% 90.26% 50.44% 20.35% 3.53% 3.53%
CIFAR10-9L Acctest 60.95% 59.83% 48.45% 44.96% 10.00% 10.00%
Accwm 71.17% 70.20% 54.91% 16.58% 16.26% 11.43%
GTSRB-RN34 Acctest 97.72% 97.72% 97.71% 97.41% 45.73% 0.47%
Accwm 72.54% 62.74% 50.98% 33.34% 11.62% 1.96%
CIFAR10-RN34 Acctest 88.41% 87.85% 87.12% 86.48% 36.69% 10.00%
Accwm 100.00% 99.00% 91.08% 81.18% 7.92% 4.95%
Caltech-RN34 Acctest 71.98% 71.06% 68.48% 63.55% 4.92% 0.33%
Accwm 93.54% 93.54% 70.96% 61.29% 6.45% 0.00%
Table 13: Accwm when querying TA with added ϵ perturba-
tion during verification. Accwm > 50% ensures successful
demonstration of ownership.
Accwm
Model / ϵ 0.0 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.5 0.75 0.9
MNIST-5L 100% 100% 100% 100% 92.30% 53.84% 30.76%
GTSRB-5L 98.23% 96.46% 88.49% 66.37% 37.16% 10.61% 4.42%
CIFAR10-9L 71.17% 69.56% 51.36% 31.56% 19.80% 7.89% 7.56%
GTSRB-RN34 72.54% 66.67% 54.90% 29.41% 21.56% 11.76% 9.80%
CIFAR10-RN34 100% 99.00% 92.07% 67.32% 39.60% 19.08% 8.91%
Caltech-RN34 93.54% 90.32% 51.61% 19.35% 6.45% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 14: Time to find the closest sample in the dataset (ms),
average over 10,000 tests. Exact lookup (Eq.) using a hash ta-
ble is done in negligible time (≈ 30ms). Calculating distances
has a substantial time overhead.
Dataset samples size Eq. L0 L2 Linf
MNIST 60,000 28x28x1 28 230 770 570
GTSRB 39,209 32x32x3 29 172 420 420
CIFAR10 50,000 32x32x3 30 243 625 615
Caltech 23,703 224x224x3 30 351 2020 2040
ImageNet 100,000 224x224x3 44 1421 7362 7370
To prevent this evasion byA, J can slightly perturb samples in
TA before submitting them for verification to FA . In Tab. 13, we
show the resilience of watermark verification to various amounts
of noise (ϵ) added to each image in TA . We show that we can
maintain Accwm > 50% for all models up to ϵ = 0.25 or even more
for some models. A can no longer perform a simple lookup in a
hash table to identify queries from J if TA is perturbed. A must
compute the distance to every sample in DA and find the nearest
neighbor to the query. We demonstrate that such search incurs
a substantial computational overhead (c.f. Tab. 14). Searching in
100,000 ImageNet samples can take over 7s per query, which is
too long to be acceptable for deployment. Also, a small distance to
an element in DA does not mean that queried image was in fact
part of DA . A has to set up a threshold for rejecting the queries
that will affect the utility of the model, on top of the described
computational overhead.
F MEETING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Unremovability W1.We extensively evaluated (Sect 6.1) that ma-
nipulation of the training process of FA either does not prevent the
embedding of the watermark or if it does, it significantly degrades
FA ’s test accuracy. Proper use of regularization can effectively mit-
igate the watermark embedding but it requires A to be granted
more capabilities e.g. increased access to relevant data. We also
showed (Sect. D) that two successive extraction attacks can remove
a watermark from FA . However, it also decreases the test accuracy
to an extent that makes FA unusable. Finally, prior work [1, 31, 48]
has shown that manipulations after training such as pruning and
adversarial fine tuning are ineffective against backdoor-based DNN
watermarks. We can conclude that DAWN watermarking meets
unremovability.
Indistinguishability X2.We defined model-specific watermark-
ing and backdoor functions (Sect. 4.1) that always return the same
same output (correct or incorrect) for the same input. We also in-
troduced a solution for mapping inputs with minor differences
to similar predictions (Sect 4.1.3). Finally, we empirically assessed
(Sect. B) that watermarks generated by DAWN are not detected by a
recent defense against watermarking/backdooring. Hence,DAWN’s
watermarks are indistinguishable by API clients.
Reliability W2 and utility X1. The watermark registration and
verification protocol that we introduce (Sect. 4.4) ensures that the
success of A in demonstrating ownership of an arbitrary model
is negligible. We showed how to set up DAWN in order to reliably
demonstrate ownership of several surrogate models stolen using
two state-of-the-art model extraction attacks with high confidence
equal to 1−2−64 (Sect. 7).DAWN effectively watermarked every sur-
rogate model FA while causing a negligible decrease of FV ’s utility
(0.03-0.5%). DAWN allows for reliable ownership demonstration
while preserving the utility.
Non-ownership piracy W3 is guaranteed by our watermark reg-
istration and verification protocol (Sect. 4.4). In case of contention,
the first registered model is deemed the original.
Linkablity W4. DAWN selects watermarked inputs from API
client queries and registers one watermark per API client. Dif-
ferent clients make different queries and they will consequently
have different watermarks. Given that we meet the reliability re-
quirement W2, a single watermark (TAi ,BV (TAi )) will succeed
in proving FAi is a surrogate of FV . Watermarks are API client-
specific which makes a surrogate model linkable to an API client.
Collusion resistance X3.DAWN relies on deterministic functions
for watermarking (WV ) and backdooring (BV ) that are specific
to FV but independent of the client sending a query. Thus, the
watermark remains indistinguishable despite collusion X2. DAWN
is resilient to a Sybil attack (bounded to a certain number of Sybils)
and assure successful verification by J (Sect. 7.3).
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